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BACK TO BANKRUPTCY’S EQUITABLE ROOTS: 
RECALIBRATE THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF 
STUDENT LOANS THROUGH A MODIFIED 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT APPROACH 
INTRODUCTION: THE NONEXISTENT LEGAL RELIEF FOR THE STUDENT 
LOAN CRISIS 
In 2004 our nation’s student loan debt stood at $345 billion.1 Today, the 
student loan debt has more than quintupled, swelling to over $1.7 trillion2 
borrowed by over forty-four million past and current American students.3 
Student loan debt is larger than credit card debt4 or automobile loan debt5 
and has serious consequences for the student debtor. The looming debt has 
forced 40% of student debtors to delay major purchases, such as a house or 
car, and caused more than a quarter to move back in with their parents or 
family members. 6  A similar percentage of student debtors have even 
delayed necessary further education they need.7 
The relief available to student debtors under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code (Bankruptcy Code) is governed by § 523(a)(8). Under § 
523(a)(8), a debtor may have their student loan debt discharged only if 
preventing the discharge of the student loan debt would impose an “undue 
hardship” on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents8  (Undue Hardship 
 
1. Student Loan Data and Demographics, Center for Microeconomic Data, FED. RSRV. BANK 
OF N.Y. (July 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/topics/student-debt [https://perm 
a.cc/DK5G-KTG4] (choose “Student Loan Data and Demographics” under “Reports and Data” to access 
an Excel spreadsheet containing student loan data from 2018). 
2. U.S. Student Debt in Real Time, STUDENT LOAN HERO BY LENDINGTREE, https://studentloan 
hero.com/student-loan-debt-clock/ [https://perma.cc/44NZ-AW3S]. 
3. Of the forty-four million borrowers, 16.8 million are under age 30, 12.3 million are between 
ages 30–39, 7.3 million are between ages 40–49, 5.2 million are between ages 50–59, and 3.2 million 
are over the age of 60. See Student Loan Data and Demographics, supra note 1. 
4. See Alina Comoreanu, Credit Card Debt Study, WALLETHUB (Dec. 8, 2020), https://wallethu 
b.com/edu/cc/credit-card-debt-study/24400#:~:text=Americans%20began%202020%20owing%20mor 
e,paydown%20ever%2C%20at%20%2460%20billion [https://perma.cc/GG7R-NWUW]; Student Loan 
Data and Demographics, supra note 1. 
5. See Jenn Jones, Average Car Payment: Loan Statistics 2021, LENDINGTREE, https://www.len 
dingtree.com/auto/debt-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/CJG7-GN4Z] (last updated Feb. 5, 2021); Student 
Loan Data and Demographics, supra note 1. 
6. See CHARLEY STONE, CARL VAN HORN & CLIFF ZUKIN, JOHN J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR 
WORKFORCE DEV., CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: RECENT COLLEGE GRADUATES AND THE GREAT 
RECESSION 13-14 (2012), http://media.philly.com/documents/20120510_Chasing_American_Dream.p 
df [https://perma.cc/GBF6-3WH6]. 
7. See id. 
8. The word “dependent” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. A leading definition used by 
the bankruptcy courts is “a person who reasonably relies on the debtor for support and whom the debtor 
 











Exception).9 Because Congress has not provided a definition of “undue 
hardship,” the judiciary has been tasked with creating judicial standards to 
delineate the Undue Hardship Exception.  
Currently, the leading majority standard is the three-part Brunner test 
(Brunner Test), which requires the debtor to demonstrate: (1) an inability to 
maintain minimal standard of living for himself and his dependents; (2) that 
additional circumstances exist indicating that the minimal standard of living 
will persist for the student loans’ repayment period; and (3) that good faith 
efforts to repay the loans have been made by the debtor (Good-Faith 
Prong). 10  This standard employs an all-or-nothing discharge approach, 
meaning that the bankruptcy court must discharge the debtor’s entire student 
loan debt or none of it—the court has no ability to discharge a portion of the 
student loan debt.11 The Brunner Test emerged out of a modification of the 
once-leading Johnson test (Johnson Test), which contained: (1) a 
mechanical test; (2) a good faith test; and (3) a policy test.12 The once-
widely-utilized Bryant Poverty test (Bryant Poverty Test) attempted to 
inject an element of objectivity into the Johnson Test by using the federal 
poverty guidelines as a basis for the debtor’s financial situation.13  The 
current minority standard is the Eighth Circuit’s totality-of-the-
circumstances test (Totality of the Circumstances Test), which “examines 
all of the circumstances surrounding a debtor’s financial situation to 
determine whether a debtor qualifies for the [Undue Hardship 
Exception].”14  
 
has reason to and does support financially.” Smith v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Smith), 582 B.R. 556, 
569 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2018) (quoting Leslie Womack Real Est. v. Dunbar (In re Dunbar), 99 B.R. 320, 
324 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1989)). A debtor’s parent may be considered a dependent. See Doe v. Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. (In re Doe), 325 B.R. 69, 77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code 
or case law suggests that a debtor should be forced to refuse to support a parent who has no other viable 
means in order to be better able to repay a student loan.”), vacated pursuant to settlement Mar. 23, 2006.  
9. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
10. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987); see 
also infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
11. See Frank T. Bayuk, Comment, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue Hardship Exception, 31 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1091, 1102 (2004) (“[B]ecause the plain language mandates either full 
dischargeability or nondischargeability, ‘§ 523(a)(8) does not authorize a partial discharge of student 
loans.’” (quoting United Student Aid Funds Inc. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 223 B.R. 747, 753 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1998))). 
12. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532, 544–
45 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979); see also Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 
661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981). 
13. Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1987); see also Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
14. Jennifer L. Frattini, Note, The Dischargeability of Student Loans: An Undue Burden?, 17 












This Note examines the bankruptcy courts’ attempt to satisfy the Undue 
Hardship Exception through the application of these four judicial tests. 
Through an analysis of each test’s shortcomings, this Note makes apparent 
the reasons why it is imperative for Congress to provide a definition of 
“undue hardship.” Not only have bankruptcy judges often bemoaned the 
duty to define “undue hardship,”15 but the four judicial tests employed by 
differing circuits have also created a lack of uniformity and consistency as 
to what constitutes “undue hardship” and, ultimately, whether a debtor is 
entitled to the discharge of their student loan debt.16 For example, a debtor 
residing in New York City will experience a much harder time establishing 
undue hardship than a debtor residing in St. Louis due to the different tests 
applied by the respective circuits.17 As it is unlikely that Congress will 
provide a definition of “undue hardship,” this Note proposes a new test to 
be adopted uniformly by the bankruptcy courts for the Undue Hardship 
Exception. A test that is adopted uniformly by all circuits will bring much 
needed consistency for both the bankruptcy courts and the debtors who seek 
discharge. This Note’s proposed test relies primarily on the current minority 
standard—the Eighth Circuit’s Totality of the Circumstances Test—
bolstered with additional factors and considerations. 
This Note proceeds in three segments. Parts I and II provide the 
legislative histories of the Bankruptcy Code and of § 523(a)(8), respectively. 
The Note will contextualize the nature of § 523(a)(8) by the various 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and the general principles upon which 
bankruptcy law is founded. 
Part III opens by describing Congress’s failure to provide a definition for 
the Undue Hardship Exception. Then Part III discusses the various Undue 
Hardship Exception tests. The judiciary’s consequent attempt to construct 
an adequate standard for the Undue Hardship Exception begins 
chronologically with the misguided Johnson Test. The Bryant Poverty Test 
follows with its laudable, yet flawed, effort to inject an element of 
objectivity to help address the Johnson Test’s shortcomings. The current 
standard followed by a majority of the circuits, the Brunner Test, is then 
 
15. See cases cited infra note 59. 
16. See Katheryn E. Hancock, Student Article, A Certainty of Hopelessness: Debt, Depression, 
and the Discharge of Student Loans Under the Bankruptcy Code, 33 L. & PSYCH. REV. 151, 165 (2009) 
(“The current body of case law may contain standards, but the way in which these standards are applied 
leads to decisions that are not uniform and many times unfair.”); Frattini, supra note 14, at 538 (arguing 
through a recent case the “inequitable and detrimental effects that can result from judicial interpretations 
of undue hardship”). 
17. The Second Circuit applies the Brunner Test. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. 
Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). The Eighth Circuit applies the Totality of the Circumstances Test. 
See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009). With different standards, it 
comes as no surprise that the results may be different as well. 











examined in depth. This section closes with the current Eighth Circuit’s 
minority approach of the Totality of the Circumstances Test. 
Part IV proposes a new standard for the federal judiciary to utilize in 
determining whether a student loan debtor has satisfied the Undue Hardship 
Exception. With an emphasis on bankruptcy’s equitable nature, this Note’s 
proposed test modifies the Totality of the Circumstances Test in three 
principal ways. Each modification is provided an explanation and analysis 
that helps demonstrate why the proposed test is superior to both the Brunner 
Test and the Totality of the Circumstances Test. 
Finally, the Note concludes with a brief summary of the inadequacies of 
the Brunner Test and the Totality of the Circumstances Test that this Note’s 
proposed approach attempts to remedy. As a result, this Note advocates for 
the uniform adoption of the proposed approach throughout the federal 
judiciary to provide the much-needed relief by American debtors. 
I. HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE CONGRESSIONAL JOURNEY 
LEADING TO THE NEAR-IMPOSSIBLE UNDUE HARDSHIP EXCEPTION 
Currently, the Bankruptcy Code is codified in Title 11 of the United 
States Code and is subdivided into nine chapters. 18  The United States 
Constitution grants Congress the power to enact “uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” 19  However, for 
much of United States history, a uniform bankruptcy system did not exist.20 
Congress exercised its express power and passed bankruptcy acts in 1800, 
1841, 1867, and 1874.21  Yet, the early bankruptcy system’s underlying 
administrative issues meant that each bankruptcy act was short-lived.22 It 
was finally through the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that Congress was able to 
 
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. One commentator has found that “[t]he bankruptcy power clause 
was added to the Constitution with little discussion, late in the drafting process, as a corollary to the 
commerce clause.” Karen M. Gebbia, The Keepers of the Code: Evolution of the Bankruptcy Community, 
91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 183, 201 (2017). 
20. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/bankruptc 
y-act-1898 [https://perma.cc/S5RX-P6LG]. Controversy over a uniform bankruptcy system involved 
key issues on “whether the bankruptcy system should (i) be primarily state or federal law, (ii) grant 
federal courts jurisdiction over nonbankruptcy questions, (iii) be administered primarily by creditors or 
the government, and, if the latter, (iv) be administered by an executive agency or judicial officers.” 
Gebbia, supra note 19, at 199. 
21. See Gebbia, supra note 19, at 210-11 (noting that these early bankruptcy acts “formulated 
the essential nature of the federal bankruptcy system and defined the fundamental balance of equities”). 
22. See id. at 202-03 (finding that these early bankruptcy acts were enacted “only when national 
financial panics overcame opposition to federal bankruptcy law . . . . As each financial panic subsided, 
the underlying concerns, combined with complaints of abuse in bankruptcy administration, and logistical 
challenges of managing bankruptcy proceedings in far-flung federal district courts, overwhelmed 












establish a national bankruptcy system that would survive. 23  The 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 survived because the act was not a response to 
“economically hard times and emergencies,” like the earlier bankruptcy acts, 
but because largescale industrialization that expanded commerce warranted 
a comprehensive bankruptcy act.24 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 laid the 
foundation for today’s bankruptcy regime. Namely, it created the idea of the 
fresh financial start principle, 25 which underlies modern bankruptcy law.26 
The fresh financial start principle, also known as the fresh start doctrine, 
functions “to give debtors a new opportunity in life and a clear field for 
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-
existing debt” (Fresh Financial Start Principle). 27  Ultimately, the Fresh 
Financial Start Principle warrants relieving debtors of their debt so that they 
can carry forward in their lives debt-free. The Fresh Financial Start Principle 
aims to further two additional fundamental policies: alleviation of debtor 
hardship and encouragement of participation in the economy.28 
The Amendatory Act of 1938—commonly referred to as the Chandler 
Act—amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.29 The Chandler Act’s fifteen 
chapters composed a far-reaching statute not only in its scope, but also its 
purpose. 30  Liquidation 31  provisions were extensively dealt with in the 
 
23. See id. at 205 (noting that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was “largely a product of creditor 
efforts”). 
24. David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical Analysis of Insolvency Laws and 
Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction of Today’s United States Bankruptcy Court and Its 
Judicial Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 165, 174-75 (2000). 
25. See id. at 175 (noting that, among other things, the act afforded relief to individuals, allowed 
individual debtors to claim exemptions to give them a chance to start over, allowed discharge of unpaid 
deficiencies, and established a uniform system of bankruptcy administration). 
26. See Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1838 (2015) (“Shielding a Chapter 7 debtor’s 
postpetition earnings from creditors enables the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor’ to make the ‘fresh start’ 
the Bankruptcy Code aims to facilitate.” (quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 
367 (2007))); Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367 (“The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a 
‘“fresh start” to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”’” (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–
87 (1991))); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286-87 (finding that a “fresh start” for the “honest but unfortunate 
debtor” is “a central purpose of the [Bankruptcy] Code.” (quoting Loc. Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 
244 (1934))). 
27. Layfield v. Dir. of Pub. Safety of Ala. (In re Layfield), 12 B.R. 846, 848 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
1981) (quoting Loc. Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244). 
28. See John Patrick Hunt, Help or Hardship?: Income-Driven Repayment in Student-Loan 
Bankruptcies, 106 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1296 (2018) (finding that “one policy underlying the [Fresh Financial 
Start Principle] is relief from the hardship of unmanageable debt”); Margaret Howard, A Theory of 
Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1048 (1987) (arguing that “discharge should 
be broadly available in order to restore the debtor to participation in the open credit economy”). 
29. See Kennedy & Clift, supra note 24, at 176 (noting that the Chandler Act was a response to 
the Depression). 
30. See id.; Gebbia, supra note 19, at 236 (finding that the Chandler Act failed to fix bankruptcy 
administration issues concerning judicial referees). 
31. Liquidation “is used in a broad sense as equivalent to ‘winding up;’ that is, the comprehensive 
 











Chandler Act’s first seven chapters, and the rehabilitation of various classes 
of debtors was encompassed in chapters eight through fifteen.32  
While there were more bankruptcy amendments passed between 1938 
and 1978,33 the next major revision came through the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 (Act of 1978), which created today’s Bankruptcy Code.34 The 
Act of 1978 brought two fundamental changes. The first was the elevation 
of bankruptcy judges into the federal judiciary.35 The second was the broad 
expansion of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. Prior to the Act of 1978, 
the predecessor of the bankruptcy court, bankruptcy referees “had no 
jurisdiction until there had been a reference by the district court to the 
referee” and “the [bankruptcy] referee’s powers were at all times subject to 
review by the district judge.”36 Through the Act of 1978, “the bankruptcy 
court essentially [gained] original, but not exclusive jurisdiction over all 
civil proceedings arising within a bankruptcy case.”37 This expansion of the 
bankruptcy court meant that bankruptcy judges were now better equipped 
to exercise their equitable powers38 to alleviate the honest debtor. The Act 
of 1978 was amended in 1984, 1986, and 1994.39 
Next, in 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).40 BAPCPA aimed to prevent 
the perceived abuse of individual debtors seeking relief pursuant to Chapter 
 
process of settling accounts, ascertaining and adjusting debts, collecting assets, and paying off claims.” 
What Is Liquidation?, THE L. DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/liquidation/ [https://perma.c 
c/VE2B-NA9H]. 
32. See Kennedy & Clift, supra note 24, at 176. 
33. See Gebbia, supra note 19, at 236-40 (describing notable amendments in 1941, Referee 
Salary Act of 1946, and amendments in 1952). 
34. One commentator argues that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was the beginning of 
bankruptcy law’s modern era. See Robert J. Landry, III, Ten Years After Consumer Bankruptcy Reform 
in the United States: A Decade of Diminishing Hope and Fairness, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 693, 696 (2016). 
35. See Charles A. Shanor, An Overview of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1979 NORTON 
ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 8; see also Kennedy & Clift, supra note 24, at 178-79 (explaining that the 
“salaries of bankruptcy judges were substantially increased; bankruptcy judges were given the authority 
to appoint law clerks and also support staff to assist them”). 
36. Kennedy & Clift, supra note 24, at 175-76. 
37. Kennedy & Clift, supra note 24, at 178; see also Shanor, supra note 35 (“[The bankruptcy 
court] is separate and independent from the district court, to which it had been attached since 1898.”). 
38. While no express grant of equitable powers exists, it has been long held that bankruptcy 
courts are “essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity.” Pepper 
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (quoting Loc. Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934)). This 
means that bankruptcy courts “appl[y] the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.” Id. (citing 
Larson v. First State Bank of Vienna, S.D. (In re Eggen), 21 F.2d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1927)). 
39. For an overview of these amendments, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the 
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 40-43 (1995). 
40. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1502 ); see also Kara J. Bruce, 












7 by shifting the individuals from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 relief. 41 While a 
Chapter 7 liquidation generally discharges unsecured debt, such as credit 
card debt, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy prevents the dischargeability of such 
consumer loans.42 Individual debtors, by being forced to file Chapter 13 
bankruptcy, will have to “take personal responsibility and repay their 
unsecured creditors.”43 Thus, BAPCPA has been argued to have created a 
shift in the fundamental policy of bankruptcy laws in favor of creditors.44 
Bankruptcy lawyers have “expressed full-throated opposition” to 
BAPCPA45 and legal academics have called its substance into question.46 
II. HISTORY OF § 523(A)(8) 
The Act of 1978 codified the dischargeability of student loan debt 
through bankruptcy. 47  Following § 439A of the Education Amendment 
Act,48 the Act of 1978 did not allow the dischargeability of student loans for 
the first five years of the loan repayment period49 unless the debtor could 
establish “undue hardship.”50 When § 523(a)(8) was first enacted in the Act 
of 1978, its purpose was to “forestall students, who frequently have a large 
excess of liabilities over assets solely because of their student loans, from 
abusing the bankruptcy system to shed these loans.”51 Congress’s fear was 
 
41. See Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Effectiveness of BAPCPA (and Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 
136-37 (2007). 
42. See id. at 137-38. 
43. Id. at 138. 
44. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 375, 375-76 (arguing that BAPCPA “radically altered the policies underlying consumer 
bankruptcy in this country, marking a significant shift in favor of creditors”). 
45. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 747, 803 (2010) (“In large measure, the organized bankruptcy bar viewed the legislation with 
disdain. Indeed, even though the principal advocates for the statute included the clients of a good slice 
of elite bankruptcy lawyers (creditor interests generally, and banks more specifically, provided the major 
impetus for the reforms), most of the bar expressed full-throated opposition.”); see also Henry J. Sommer, 
Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005”, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 (2005) (finding 
BAPCPA’s enactment to be “a story of money, political mean-spiritedness, and intellectual dishonesty”). 
46. Brian Rothschild, The Illogic of No Limits on Bankruptcy, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 473, 
475 n.1 (2007) (collecting BAPCPA criticism and describing the academic response as “consistently 
negative”). 
47. See Frattini, supra note 14, at 539. 
48. Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 439A, 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (codified 
at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976)) (repealed 1978) (prohibiting discharge of student loans in bankruptcy for 
the first five years of loan repayment unless the debtor could establish undue hardship). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (citing COMM’N ON THE BANKR. L. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. II, at 140 n.14 (1973)). 











that students would finance their education through student loans, then 
immediately obtain a discharge through bankruptcy upon graduation 
without any attempt to repay.52  
In 1990, the five-year dischargeability exception was extended to seven 
years.53  Then, in 1998, the Bankruptcy Code eliminated the seven-year 
dischargeability exception for federally-guaranteed student loans and 
provided that these loans could only be discharged through the Undue 
Hardship Exception.54  Finally, starting in 2005, BAPCPA removed the 
seven-year dischargeability exception entirely, and the Undue Hardship 
Exception became the only available means for all educational loans—both 
government-issued and private student loans. 55  Legislative history 
regarding BAPCPA’s removal the seven-year dischargeability exception is 
“sparse.”56 However, Representative Lindsey Graham of South Carolina 
seems to have originated the idea on May 5, 1999 when he stated, “we are 
trying to give the private lender the same protection under bankruptcy that 
the federally guaranteed loan program has.”57  Representative Graham’s 
purpose was to provide private institutional lenders stronger protection by 
making discharge of student loans harder for their debtors.58 
III. WHAT IS THE UNDUE HARDSHIP EXCEPTION? 
“Undue hardship” is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code.59 Through a 
trial-and-error approach of creating, amending, and re-amending different 
standards, 60  the judiciary has attempted over the years to unpack what 
 
52. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 170; see also id. at 176-77 (reporting that the Commission 
found it “reprehensible” and “a threat to the continuance of educational loan programs” that “[s]ome 
individuals have financed their education and upon graduation have filed petitions under the Bankruptcy 
Act and obtained a discharge without any attempt to repay the educational loan and without the presence 
of any extenuating circumstance”). 
53. See Student Loan Default Prevention Initiative Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 3006(b), 
104 Stat. 1388-25, 1388-28 to -29. See also Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy 
and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 363–64 (2013). 
54. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 104-244, § 971, 112 Stat. 1581, 
1837. 
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
56. Nunez v. Key Educ. Res./GLESI (In re Nunez), 527 B.R. 410, 413 (Bankr. D. Or. 2015) 
(“The legislative history with respect to BAPCPA’s amendments to § 523(a)(8) is sparse . . . .”). 
57. 145 Cong. Rec. 8567 (1999) (statement of Rep. Graham). 
58. See id. 
59. See Speer v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Speer), 272 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2001) (“[T]he statute Congress crafted gives the Courts absolutely no guidance as to what would 
constitute ‘undue hardship’ other than a Webster’s dictionary.”); Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re 
Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (“Without express statutory definition, ‘undue hardship’ 
has proved an eely notion. Courts have long struggled to articulate its content.”). 
60. See Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, Bankruptcy, and the Fresh Start Policy: Must Debtors 













exactly “undue hardship” means within the Bankruptcy Code.61 The lack of 
congressional guidance has left the judiciary on an island to create an 
“undue hardship” standard, and no uniform standard exists today.62 
A. The Johnson Test—A Misguided First Attempt at the Undue Hardship 
Exception 
The Johnson Test was the federal judiciary’s first attempt at formulating 
an “undue hardship” standard.63 The Johnson Test employs three prongs, 
each of which is necessary to determine whether the student debtor is 
entitled to the Undue Hardship Exception in § 523(a)(8).64 
The first prong is a mechanical analysis where the court asks whether 
“the debtor’s future financial resources for the longest foreseeable period of 
time allowed for the repayment of the loan be sufficient to support the debtor 
and his dependent[s] at a subsistence or poverty standard of living, as well 
as to fund repayment of the student loan[.]”65 With this inquiry, the court is 
assessing the sufficiency of the debtor’s financial resources, both in the 
present and future, to determine whether the debtor and her dependents can 
live at or above poverty while simultaneously making repayments on the 
loans. “If the debtor is living above poverty level, and is still capable of 
making the minimal payments toward her loans, then the test is satisfied and 
the debt cannot be discharged.”66 The test’s strict language of “subsistence 
or poverty” level has been derided as a “harsh standard” that “is 
contradictory to the basic principles of United States bankruptcy laws, 
which exist so that individuals who are over their heads in debt are not 
forced to live an oppressive lifestyle.”67 
The second prong is a good faith test where the court asks two questions: 
“(a) Was the debtor negligent or irresponsible in his efforts to minimize 
 
variations [of undue hardship standards] that exist from court to court are staggering. Even courts 
purporting to use the same test will differ in the subtleties with which the test is applied.”). 
61. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 753 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“The existence of the adjective ‘undue’ indicates that Congress viewed garden-variety 
hardship as insufficient excuse for a discharge of student loans, but the statute otherwise gives no hint 
of the phrase’s intended meaning.”); Robert C. Cloud, When Does Repaying a Student Loan Become an 
Undue Hardship?, 185 EDUC. L. REP. 783, 784 (2004) (observing that “[m]any bankruptcy courts have 
interpreted undue hardship harshly and narrowly”). 
62. See Edward Paul Canterbury, Comment, The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy: A 
Debtor’s Guide to Obtaining Relief, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 149, 149 (2006) (noting that the undue 
hardship standard “has produced unpredictable and unfair results due to Congress’ failure to adequately 
define the contours of the standard”). 
63. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979); see also In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993). 
64. In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 544–45. 
65. In re Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1134. 
66. Frattini, supra note 14, at 553. 
67. Id. at 554. 











expenses, maximize resources or secure employment? [and] (b) If ‘yes,’ 
then would lack of such negligence or irresponsibility have altered the 
answer to the mechanical test?”68 With this inquiry, the court is determining 
whether the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay her student loans. 
If a debtor proves good faith efforts to repay her student loans, then the debt 
should be discharged.69 However, if the court finds that the debtor did not 
act in good faith—namely, if the debtor acted negligently or irresponsibly—
then “a presumption against discharge is established and the court must then 
proceed to the third prong of the [Johnson Test].”70 This good faith test, 
however, has been criticized for being too subjective.71 In practice, the good 
faith test allows for an “overly critical” determination of what are 
“reasonable” actions by the debtor.72 Judges are afforded a “broad power” 
to “probe into the daily lives of debtors by arbitrarily deciding which actions 
of the debtor are proper and improper.”73 
If the debtor passes the first two prongs, then the court reaches the 
Johnson Test’s final prong. This last prong is a policy test where the court 
asks: 
Do the circumstances—i.e., the amount and percentage of the total 
indebtedness of the student loan and the employment prospects of the 
petitioner indicate:  
 (a) [t]hat the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy petition was to 
discharge the student debt, or  
 (b) [t]hat the debtor has definitively benefitted financially from 
the education which the loan helped to finance?74 
In other words, based on the debtor’s financial circumstances, the 
bankruptcy petition’s main purpose must not be an attempt to discharge the 
student loan debt, and the debtor must not have gained a benefit financially 
from the education received by the student loans. If either question is 
answered in the affirmative, then the debt cannot be discharged. 
 
68. In re Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1134-35; see also Frattini, supra note 14, at 554 (explaining that 
“the rationale behind the good faith test is consistent with both the [Bankruptcy] Code’s fresh start policy 
as well as the congressional objective of precluding intentional abusers from discharging their student 
loans, while granting relief to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’”). 
69. Frattini, supra note 14, at 554. 
70. Id. 
71. See, e.g., id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. For an example of the prong’s harshness and subjectivity afford to the judges, see Boston 
v. Utah Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Boston), 119 B.R. 162, 165 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) 
(finding a debtor who attempted to find employment but was unsuccessful to fail the good faith prong 
because the court found that the debtor failed to prove the existence of other employment opportunities 
within the debtor’s home city or elsewhere). 












The Johnson Test’s three prongs illustrate its complexity and inherent 
subjectivity, which has caused the test to be rejected by a majority of the 
courts.75 While bankruptcy courts are guided by negligence principles to 
determine whether a debtor has fulfilled the good faith test, bankruptcy 
judges still possess the ability to peer into a debtor’s personal life to 
determine subjectively whether good faith has been satisfied. Additionally, 
the last prong, the policy test, affords the bankruptcy courts too much 
subjectivity in determining whether the circumstances demonstrate that the 
“dominant” purpose of the bankruptcy petition was to discharge student 
loans. Nevertheless, the test has served as the foundation for the Bryant 
Poverty Test and the Brunner Test. 
B. Bryant Poverty Test—A Flawed Attempt of Objectivity 
In an attempt to address the Johnson Test’s inherent subjectivity, the 
Bryant Poverty Test was created to “place the element of objectivity into 
the process of decision-making.” 76  The Bryant Poverty Test has been 
proposed as follows: 
We propose, as a starting position, to analyze the income and 
resources of the debtor and his dependents in relation to federal 
poverty guidelines established by the United States Bureau of the 
Census and determine the dischargeability of the student loan 
obligation on the basis of whether the debtor’s income is substantially 
over the amounts set forth in those guidelines or not. If not, a 
discharge will result only if the debtor can establish “unique” and 
“extraordinary” circumstances which should nevertheless render the 
debt dischargeable. If the debtor’s income is below or close to the 
guideline, the lender can prevail only by establishing that 
circumstances exist which render these guidelines unrealistic, such as 
the debtor's failure to maximize his resources or clear prospects of 
the debtor for future income increases. We feel that such a test will 
decrease, if not eliminate, the resort to the unbridled subjectivity 
which seems to pervade many of the decisions in this area.77 
In other words, the Bryant Poverty Test attempts to alleviate the subjectivity 
afforded to bankruptcy judges under the Johnson Test by using the federal 
poverty guidelines as an objective guide to measure the debtor’s minimum 
 
75. See Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 n.2 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (criticizing the Johnson test as “unfortunately complicated” and creating a new 
test); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135 (expressly rejecting the Johnson Test). 
76. In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915. 
77. Id. (emphasis added). 











standard of living.78 If the debtor is found to earn an income below the 
federal poverty guidelines, then the debtor is below the minimal standard of 
living, which warrants the discharge of student loans. Conversely, if the 
debtor is earning an income above the federal poverty guidelines, then the 
debtor is above the minimal standard of living. If the debtor is earning an 
income above the federal poverty guidelines, the debtor has an opportunity 
to demonstrate dire circumstances that still warrant the student loan 
discharge. 79  However, like the Johnson Test, judges are afforded 
subjectivity in determining whether the debtor’s dire circumstances are 
actually so dire as to render the student debt discharged.80 Thus, the attempt 
to correct the Johnson Test’s subjectivity through the federal poverty 
guidelines may be laudable, but the Bryant Poverty Test fails to eliminate it 
completely. 
Additionally, scholars have scrutinized the use of the federal poverty 
guidelines as an objective measure for a debtor’s minimal standard of living. 
One scholar has noted, “[o]ne of the foremost goals of the bankruptcy 
system is to give a fresh start to individuals plagued with debt so that they 
are not forced to live in poverty.”81 But this does not mean that a debtor 
must live in poverty to receive a fresh start. A debtor may be in severe 
financial crisis unable to pay student loans even though they are not below 
the poverty level. Utilizing the federal poverty guidelines erroneously 
assumes that the debtor cannot afford to pay their student loan payments 
unless the debtor is living below poverty. The dire circumstances inquiry 
does not solve the problem because the considerable discretion afforded to 
judges renders the burden to prove dire circumstances remarkably high. 
Another critic has noted that individuals living near or at what the federal 
poverty guidelines consider as the bare subsistence level can barely afford 
 
78. The court establishing the Bryant Poverty Test held that the federal poverty guidelines are an 
appropriate measure because they represent the bare subsistence level of income and serve as an 
eligibility criterion for federal assistance programs. See id. at 916. 
79. See Mayer v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Mayer), 198 B.R. 116, 125-26 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). In In re Mayer, a debtor parent earning an income slightly above the applicable 
poverty guidelines successfully demonstrated that she reduced her standard of living so drastically by 
leaving her home to move in with her mother in a public housing unit. Id. The court, alluding to student 
loan payments, found that “[a]ny added expenses would simply be intolerable to impose upon her at 
present.” Id. at 126. 
80. See Reyes v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Educ. (In re Reyes), 154 B.R. 320, 324 (Bankr. 
E.D. Okla. 1993). In In re Reyes, a family of six earning an income of $23,529, which is approximately 
$4,000 above the applicable poverty guideline, was prevented discharge of student loans. Id. The court 
found that the medical issues and associated hospitalizations of debtor’s eldest son did not establish a 
dire circumstance. Id. 
81. Frattini, supra note 14, at 557; see also Correll v. Union Nat’l Bank of Pittsburgh (In re 
Correll), 105 B.R. 302, 306 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (“We do not believe . . . Congress intended a fresh 













a minimal standard of living, let alone attempt to pay back loans.82 Living 
on an income slightly above the federal poverty guidelines—thus, not 
technically considered living in poverty—is already an immense financial 
hardship.83 At least one scholar has even argued that the federal poverty 
guidelines are “anything but objective . . . represent[ing] a normative 
standard reflecting the opinion of a governmental agency on the relative 
severity of income deprivation.”84 
Further, the Department of Education85 and the court that created the 
Bryant Poverty Test86 both view the federal poverty guidelines as extremely 
and unjustly low. The Bryant court attempted to solve the issue through a 
dire circumstances prong, which was not successful in practice given the 
inherent subjectivity and high burden for debtors. Moreover, many 
government departments do not use the federal poverty guidelines.87 The 
federal poverty guidelines are calculated by taking the sum of three times 
the monetary amount a household spends on an economy food plan.88 The 
federal poverty guidelines assume that “an average family’s total budget is 
three times the amount it spends on food.”89 Using a food plan—particularly 
a food plan designed “for emergency or temporary dietary needs . . . [not] 
an adequate, permanent diet”90—as the sole basis for the federal poverty 
guidelines thoughtlessly ignores other basic life necessities, let alone the 
need to repay student loan debt. It should come as no surprise that “[p]overty 
should be defined in terms of those who are denied the minimal levels of 
health, housing, food, and education that our present stage of scientific 
knowledge specifies as necessary for life as it is now lived in the United 
 
82. See Salvin, supra note 60, at 162. 
83. For example, the 2019 federal poverty guidelines state that a family of four is not living in 
poverty until the total annual family income is under $25,750. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty 
Guidelines, 84 Fed. Reg. 1167, 1168 (Feb. 1, 2019).  
84. See Salvin, supra note 60, at 185, 185 n.281 (arguing that the federal government, through 
the Census Bureau, has admitted that the poverty guidelines are “necessarily subjective” (quoting 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., WORKERS WITH LOW EARNINGS: 1964–1990 B-3 
(1992))). 
85. See Salvin, supra note 60, at 188. 
86. See Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 916 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1987) (“[T]he poverty-guideline figures are, in our view, extremely grim . . . .”). 
87. Until 1985, the Bureau of Labor Statistics calculated an alternative measure of poverty, 
which had substantially higher figures than the federal poverty guidelines. The Department of Labor 
continues to use the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s measure for certain programs. See ANDREW J. WINNICK, 
TOWARD TWO SOCIETIES: THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME AND WEALTH IN THE U.S. SINCE 
1960 24-25 (1989). 
88. Gordon M. Fisher, The Development and History of the U.S. Poverty Thresholds—A Brief 
Overview, GOV’T STAT. SECTION/SOC. STAT. SECTION NEWSLETTER, Winter 1997, at 6, 6 (noting that 
the original poverty thresholds were based on a “economy food plan,” which is “the cheapest of four 
food plans developed by the Department of Agriculture,” and what “the Agriculture Department 
describe[s] . . . as being ‘designed for temporary or emergency use when funds are low’”). 
89. Salvin, supra note 60, at 186. 
90. Id. 











States.”91 These individuals who unfortunately live at or near the poverty 
line are exactly the debtors the bankruptcy system was intended to help.  
Additionally, in examining the legislative goals underlying the 
dischargeability for student loans, one court found that Congress was 
attempting to preclude “graduates [from escaping] their student loan 
obligations by filing bankruptcy on the eve of a lucrative career.”92 Student 
loan debtors scraping by at the poverty level certainly are not part of these 
dishonest deliberate debtors attempting to abuse the bankruptcy system.93 
For this reason, the Bryant court disagreed with the Johnson Test’s inquiring 
into the debtor’s purpose for filing bankruptcy as part of its policy prong 
because “avoiding the consequences of debts is normally the reason for 
filing for bankruptcy.”94 However, as the Third Circuit noted, “[t]he purpose 
behind the debtor’s bankruptcy petition is not irrelevant . . . because one of 
the reasons that Congress enacted § 523(a)(8)(B) was in response to ‘reports 
of students discharging student loan debts after graduation and subsequently 
accepting high-paying jobs.’”95 For these reasons in particular, then, the 
Bryant Poverty Test has not been widely followed in bankruptcy courts 
across the nation. 
C. Brunner Test—A Misguided Majority Approach Influenced by the 
Johnson Test 
Currently, the Brunner Test is followed by an overwhelming majority of 
circuits.96 For example, the Fourth Circuit favors the Brunner Test because 
 
91. SHARON M. OSTER, ELIZABETH E. LAKE & CONCHITA GENE OKSMAN, THE DEFINITION AND 
MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY 18 (1978). 
92. Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 130 (B.A.P. 
8th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 
549 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 
752, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing COMM’N ON THE BANKR. L. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. II, at 140 n.14 (1973)). 
93. See Frattini, supra note 14, at 557. 
94. Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 n.2 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1987). 
95. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Kurt Wiese, Note, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy: The Bankruptcy Court Tests of 
“Undue Hardship”, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 446 (1984)); see also In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755 (citing 
COMM’N ON THE BANKR. L. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. II, at 140 n.14 (1973)). 
96. Professor John Patrick Hunt has found, “[i]n addition to the Second Circuit where it 
originated, the Brunner [T]est has been adopted in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits.” Hunt, supra note 28, at 1324 n.279 (collecting cases). In addition to Professor 
Hunt’s list, there are a number of more recent cases relying on the Brunner Test. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. 
Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005); Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. 
Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 358-59 (6th Cir. 2007); Alderete v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In 













it “incorporates the congressional mandate to allow discharge of student 
loans only in limited circumstances.”97 The Fourth Circuit has also cited its 
concern for “[u]niformity among the circuits” as support for the use of the 
Brunner Test.98 Additionally, the Third Circuit stated, “[the] Brunner [Test] 
is the most consistent with the scheme that Congress established in 1978” 
for it “meets the practical needs of the debtor by not requiring that he or she 
live in abject poverty for up to seven years99 before a student loan may be 
discharged.”100 To satisfy the Undue Hardship Exception, the Brunner Test, 
like the Johnson Test, requires a three-part showing:  
1) that the debtor cannot, based on current income and expenses, 
maintain a “minimal” standard of living for himself or herself and his 
or her dependents if forced to repay the loans, 2) that this state of 
affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment 
period of the student loan, and 3) that the debtor has made good faith 
efforts to repay the loans.101 
For the first step, the debtor must persuade the court that if he has to repay 
his student loans, his current income and expenses preclude him from 
maintaining a minimal standard of living for himself and his dependents. 
Some courts have stated that, “[i]mplicit within this inquiry is the 
requirement that the debtor demonstrate that she is actively minimizing her 
current household living expenses and maximizing personal and 
professional resources.”102  If the debtor demonstrates this first step, the 
debtor must then establish that such financial situation will continue for a 
large part of the student loan repayment period as agreed upon in the loan 
agreement.  
 
348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 
1324-25 (11th Cir. 2007); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1112 
(9th Cir. 1998); In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 306; Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 794 F.3d 756, 759 
(7th Cir. 2015). “The First Circuit has declined to choose between the Brunner [Test] and [Totality of 
the Circumstances Test]” and the D.C. Circuit did not articulate a standard. Hunt, supra note 28, at 1324 
n.279; see Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006) (“We see 
no need in this case to pronounce our views of a preferred method of identifying a case of ‘undue 
hardship.’”); Gilchrist v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 88-5106, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 18806, at *2 (D.C. Cir. 
Dec. 30, 1988). 
97. In re Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400. 
98. Id. 
99. “Seven years” refers to the now-abolished seven-year dischargeability exception. See supra 
note 55 and accompanying text. 
100. In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 305; see also Landry, supra note 34, at 696.  
101. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985). 
102. Healey v. Mass. Higher Educ. (In re Healey), 161 B.R. 389, 394 (E.D. Mich. 1993); see also 
Evans v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Evans), 131 B.R. 372, 375 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991). 











The Brunner court equated this second step to a “certainty of 
hopelessness” standard (Certainty of Hopelessness).103 In other words, the 
first two steps require that the “debtor be presently earning an income that 
is insufficient for maintaining a minimal standard of living, but . . . also . . . 
that this condition will continue indefinitely.” 104  Once the debtor 
successfully demonstrates the onerous second step, the debtor must also 
prove that he has made good faith efforts to repay his student loans—the 
Good-Faith Prong.105 As this last step in the Brunner Test is likened to the 
Johnson Test’s policy prong, there may be subjectivity issues embedded 
within it as well.106 
Certainty of Hopelessness requires showing that the debtor “truly is 
without hope” in repaying his student loans.107 That is, the debtor must make 
a showing well beyond the debtor’s current temporary inability to make loan 
payments. 108  One court accurately captured just how inequitable the 
Certainty of Hopelessness is by expressing that the debtor must be “severely 
disadvantaged economically as a result of unique factors which are so much 
a part of the bankrupt’s life, present and in the foreseeable future, that the 
expectation of repayment is virtually non-existent, unless by that effort the 
bankrupt strips himself of all that makes life worth living.”109 The unrealistic 
expectation of the Certainty of Hopelessness standard—and how high of a 
burden of proof it carries—demonstrates that it should not be utilized by 
bankruptcy courts performing their function as courts of equity 110  in 
determining student loan dischargeability.111 
 
103. See In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755 (“Perhaps the best articulation of this doctrine is that . . . 
‘dischargeability of student loans should be based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not simply a 
present inability to fulfill financial commitment.’” (quoting Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Briscoe), 16 
B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.1981))). 
104. Frattini, supra note 14, at 561. 
105. This third step has been likened to the Johnson Test’s good faith prong. See id. at 563. 
106. See id. at 554. For examples of the inherent subjectivity within this final step, see Sands v. 
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Sands), 166 B.R. 299, 312 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994); Reilly v. 
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Reilly), 118 B.R. 38, 40 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990). 
107. Vujovic v. Direct Loans & The Educ. Res. Inst., Inc. (In re Vujovic), 388 B.R. 684, 692 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2008). 
108. See Tirch v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Tirch), 409 F.3d 677, 681 (6th Cir. 
2005); Goulet v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 284 F.3d 773, 778 (7th Cir. 2002). 
109. Barrows v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm’n (In re Barrows), 182 B.R. 640, 648 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. 1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Courtney v. Gainer Bank (In re Courtney), 79 B.R. 1004, 1010 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987)). 
110. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
111. For an example of the harshness of the Certainty of Hopelessness standard, see Walcott v. 
USA Funds, Inc. (In re Walcott), 185 B.R. 721 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995). Additionally, courts and 
commentators have criticized the Brunner Test’s second step for being too speculative—namely, “it 
requires a court to predict future events.” Green v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Green), 238 B.R. 
727, 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (citing Kraft v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Kraft), 













The Brunner Test’s third and final step requires that the debtor 
demonstrate that he has made good faith efforts to repay his student loans. 
In other words, the Good-Faith Prong requires that the debtor’s inability to 
repay student loans was not caused by his own fault.112 While this prong 
was created in accordance with the legislative intent to prevent intentional 
abusers from filing bankruptcy “too soon after graduation . . . [without] 
adequate time to find employment and to attempt to pay off his student 
loans,” 113  it is marred by the same subjectivity concerns pervading the 
Johnson Test. 
One court’s stringent application of the Good-Faith Prong demonstrates 
the prong’s subjectivity issues and its inconsistency with bankruptcy’s 
equitable nature. In Stebbins-Hopf v. Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. 
(In re Stebbins-Hopf), the debtor and her family were suffering from 
significant health issues.114 The debtor had foot nerve damage, bronchitis, 
and arthritis; her mother had cancer, her adult daughter was an epileptic, 
and her grandchildren were asthmatic. 115  She utilized her financial 
resources toward her and her family’s medical expenses rather than 
fulfilling her student loan repayment obligations.116 The bankruptcy court 
held that the debtor failed to act in good faith by placing her family’s health 
before her student loan obligations stating, “her moral obligation to family 
members who are not dependents does not take priority over her legal 
obligation to repay her educational loans.”117 Under bankruptcy’s equitable 
jurisprudence, one must strain to equate this type of debtor—a debtor who 
used her scarce financial resources to help her ailing family members—with 
the intentional abuser Congress originally had in mind for § 523(a)(8). 
Rather, as one commentator wrote, the debtor in In re Stebbins-Hopf “is 
exactly the type for which the bankruptcy system and the undue hardship 
exception for the discharge of student loans were devised.”118 
 
re Dolph), 215 B.R. 832, 837-38 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he question of what [a debtor’s] future 
holds in store for him—be it a new and better job or be it a promotion with his present employer—is 
unknown, and any immediate evaluation of the likelihood for positive change in [a debtor’s] present or 
future financial circumstances is speculative and not a firm basis for the Court to reach a decision.”). 
112. The Third Circuit has instructed that “[t]he [Brunner Test’s Good-Faith Prong] is to be 
guided by the understanding that ‘undue hardship encompasses a notion that the debtor may not willfully 
or negligently cause his own default, but rather his condition must result from “factors beyond his 
reasonable control.”’” Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (quoting In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
113. Sands v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Sands), 166 B.R. 299, 312 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1994). 
114. Stebbins-Hopf v. Tex. Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. (In re Stebbins-Hopf), 176 B.R. 784, 
785 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 788. 
117. Id. 
118. Frattini, supra note 14, at 564. 











While the Brunner Test is the leading standard within the federal 
judiciary for the Undue Hardship Exception, the utter harshness of the 
Certainty of Hopelessness second prong coupled with the bankruptcy 
court’s inherent subjectivity in determining the Good-Faith Prong prevents 
honest debtors from receiving the help that the equitable nature of 
bankruptcy courts was designed to lend. 
D. Totality of the Circumstances Test—A Step in the Right Direction 
Currently, the Totality of the Circumstances Test is only followed by the 
Eighth Circuit.119 When applying the Totality of the Circumstances Test, a 
bankruptcy court “examines all of the circumstances surrounding a debtor’s 
financial situation to determine whether a debtor qualifies for the [Undue 
Hardship Exception], rather than applying a three part test.” 120  By 
eliminating the adherence to formalistic and rigid steps, as required by the 
Johnson Test, Bryant Poverty Test, and the Brunner Test, the Totality of the 
Circumstances Test allows the bankruptcy court to better perform its 
equitable powers.121 While examining all of the debtor’s relevant financial 
circumstances, the prime objective of the Totality of the Circumstances Test 
is to “determine whether the debtor is the intentional abuser that Congress 
sought to prevent from taking advantage of the system or a debtor truly in 
need of and entitled to a discharge.”122 
When applying the Totality of the Circumstances Test, the bankruptcy 
court considers the debtor’s past and future financial resources, the debtor’s 
reasonable living expenses, and any other relevant circumstance.123  The 
“debtor has the burden of proving undue hardship by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”124 While the debtor’s financial resources and standard of living 
are two necessary considerations, the bankruptcy court may consider any 
 
119. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 1324–25 (“The only circuit in which a federal appellate court has 
embraced a test other than that of Brunner is the Eighth Circuit, which follows the ‘totality-of-the-
circumstances’ test.”); see also Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 
2009). 
120. Frattini, supra note 14, at 564-65. 
121. See Coleman v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Coleman), 98 B.R. 443, 451 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ind. 1989) (“Rigid adherence by the court to a particular test robs the court of the discretion 
envisioned by Congress in drafting [§ 523(a)(8)]. The court finds that the more equitable approach is to 
view each case in the totality of circumstances involved.”). For background on the bankruptcy court’s 
equitable nature, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
122. Frattini, supra note 14, at 566. 
123. See Jesperson, 571 F.3d at 779 (“Reviewing courts must consider the debtor’s past, present, 
and reasonably reliable future financial resources, the debtor’s reasonable and necessary living expenses, 
and ‘any other relevant facts and circumstances.’” (quoting Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re 
Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003))). 
124. Id. (noting that the burden is “rigorous”). To be able to differentiate between intentional 












other factors that it deems relevant.125 Given the “rigorous”126 burden on the 
debtor and the two necessary considerations of the debtor’s financial 
resources and standard of living, “if the debtor’s reasonable future financial 
resources will sufficiently cover payment of the student loan debt—while 
still allowing for a minimal standard of living—then the debt should not be 
discharged.”127 
While the Totality of the Circumstances Test attempts to predict future 
events, which invites the possibility of speculation and subjectivity by the 
court like the Johnson Test, Bryant Poverty Test, and the Brunner Test, the 
Eighth Circuit has provided explicit instructions to help inject objectivity 
and to better prevent speculation. The Eighth Circuit has placed a focus on 
the debtor’s quantifiable financial documents stating the court’s 
“determination will require a special consideration of the debtor’s present 
employment and financial situation—including assets, expenses, and 
earnings—along with the prospect of future changes—positive or adverse—
in the debtor’s financial position.”128 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has 
 
125. Other factors taken into consideration include:  
(1) Total incapacity now and in the future to pay one’s debts for reasons not within the control 
of the debtor. (2) Whether the debtor has made a good faith effort to negotiate a deferment or 
forbearance of payment. (3) Whether the hardship will be long-term. (4) Whether the debtor 
has made payments on the student loan. (5) Whether there is permanent or long-term disability 
of the debtor. (6) The ability of the debtor to obtain gainful employment in the area of study. 
(7) Whether the debtor has made a good faith effort to maximize income and minimize 
expenses. (8) Whether the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy petition was to discharge the 
student loans. (9) The ratio of the student loan to the total indebtedness. 
VerMaas v. Student Loans of N.D. (In re VerMaas), 302 B.R. 650, 656-57 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2003) 
(quoting Morris v. Univ. of Ark. (In re Morris), 277 B.R. 910, 914 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2002)). Another 
noteworthy factor considered is whether the debtor has a Certainty of Hopelessness. See Mulherin v. 
Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Mulherin), 297 B.R. 559, 564 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003); DeBrower v. 
Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re DeBrower), 387 B.R. 587, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2008). It 
is important to note that in the Brunner Test, the Certainty of Hopelessness is essentially a requirement. 
See supra note 103 and accompanying text; Frattini, supra note 14, at 561. For the Totality of the 
Circumstances Test, the Certainty of Hopelessness seems to be merely considered as a factor. See 
Jesperson, 571 F.3d at 783–84 (Smith, J., concurring) (“[F]airness and equity require each undue 
hardship case to be examined on the unique facts and circumstances that surround the particular 
bankruptcy.” (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554)). However, the 
language of the opinion of a few bankruptcy courts within the Eighth Circuit seems to suggest that the 
Certainty of Hopelessness may be a requirement rather than a factor. See, e.g., In re VerMaas, 302 B.R. 
at 657 (“The hardship must be more than mere unpleasantness. [It] must present a certainty of 
hopelessness and not a mere present inability to meet financial commitments due to a current, temporary 
state of unemployment.” (alteration in original) (quoting Randall v. Norwest Student Loan Servs. (In re 
Randall), 255 B.R. 570, 577 (Bankr. D.N.D. 2000))). For more on Certainty of Hopelessness, see supra 
notes 103-104 and accompanying text. 
126. Jesperson, 571 F.3d at 779. 
127. Id. (quoting In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554-55). 
128. In re VerMaas, 302 B.R. at 656 (quoting In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554–55). For example, the 
VerMaas court, as part of its determination, focused on the quantifiable expenses of the debtor, such as 
credit card debt as shown through bank statements. Id. at 658. 











clearly instructed that speculation is not permitted by a court.129  These 
instructions are certainly not ideal, yet they provide more protection for the 
debtor against the court’s subjectivity and speculation than the other tests. 
By focusing on a multitude of factors—rather than a three-part test—the 
Totality of the Circumstances Test avoids “[r]igid adherence . . . [that] robs 
the court of the discretion envisioned by Congress in drafting [§ 
523(a)(8)].”130 Additionally, viewing each case through the Totality of the 
Circumstances Test is more consonant with the equitable nature of 
bankruptcy because the test “allows the court to more uniformly manage the 
equities of each case in view of the legislative intent and policies of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”131 Commentator Kurt Wiese has stated that the Totality 
of the Circumstances Test is most aligned with the intent of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978.132 
However, the test is not without its criticisms. Even with the Eighth 
Circuit’s attempt to infuse objectivity and to curb speculation, it has been 
argued that the Totality of the Circumstances Test can lead to 
“unpredictable and inconsistent standards of undue hardship” because the 
test is nonetheless inherently subjective and contains “numerous and 
varying factors different courts [can] consider.”133  In fact, “[u]nder the 
current standard [of the Totality of the Circumstances Test] courts may 
choose from a multitude of factors and apply any combination of them to a 
given case, which only adds to the ambiguity and complexity of determining 
what constitutes undue hardship.”134 Courts must address this failure to 
provide more definite guideposts on which factors to consider, because 
otherwise bankruptcy judges are left open to consider any factor in 
determining undue hardship.  
 
129. See Jesperson, 571 F.3d at 780 (“A court may not engage in speculation when determining 
net income and reasonable and necessary living expenses. To be reasonable and necessary, an expense 
must be ‘modest and commensurate with the debtor’s resources.’” (quoting In re DeBrower, 387 B.R. 
at 590) (citing Rose v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Rose), 324 B.R. 709, 712 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005))). 
130. Coleman v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Coleman), 98 B.R. 443, 451 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ind. 1989) (noting that the rigid adherence to the Johnson Test, Bryant Poverty Test, and the Brunner 
Test “would work to penalize the truly honest and desperate debtor and clash with the notions of a fresh 
start”). 
131. Id. 
132. Kurt Wiese, Note, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy: The Bankruptcy Court Tests 
of “Undue Hardship”, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 447 (1984) (“The drafters [of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978] said that bankruptcy courts must decide undue hardship on a case-by-case basis, considering 
all of a debtor’s circumstances.”). 
133. Frattini, supra note 14, at 565. 












IV. PROPOSAL—ALIGN THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF STUDENT LOANS 
WITH BANKRUPTCY’S EQUITABLE NATURE BY ADOPTING A MODIFIED 
VERSION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
TEST 
To help remedy the issues surrounding the Undue Hardship Exception 
of § 523(a)(8), Congress should revise the statute to clarify the meaning of 
“undue hardship.” Given that Congress has not provided a definition for 
more than four decades, 135  a legislative definition that would bring 
uniformity and consistency seems unlikely. In the meantime, the judiciary 
must utilize its powers to adopt a new test to apply the Undue Hardship 
Exception.  
Although the Brunner Test is precedent in nine federal circuits,136 the 
courts should forego the rigid three-part test and adopt a modified version 
of the Totality of the Circumstances Test. The modified Totality of the 
Circumstances Test (Modified Test) would replace its current third 
consideration, “any other relevant facts and circumstances,” with a 
reinforced Brunner Test’s Good-Faith Prong, 137  which would limit the 
possibility of courts considering any and all factors. 138  Although the 
Brunner Test’s Good-Faith Prong has its shortcomings, 139  a modified 
version is essential to capture Congress’s original intent—that is, to help 
truly honest debtors. In reinforcing the Good-Faith Prong, courts should 
provide clear instructions on its application with a focus on the Bankruptcy 
Code’s equitable nature in order to reduce the court’s subjectivity and 
prevent another situation like Ms. Stebbins-Hopf’s from occurring. 140 
Furthermore, keeping the Modified Test aligned with the Bankruptcy 
Code’s equitable nature, bankruptcy courts should be permitted to use their 
equitable powers and allow a partial discharge of the debtor’s student loans, 
rather than the current approach’s all-or-nothing stance. 141  Within this 
Modified Test, the Certainty of Hopelessness—as a factor or requirement—
would be entirely omitted.142  
 
135. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. The Undue Hardship Exception was first 
codified in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
136. See cases cited supra note 96. 
137. For a refresher on the Brunner Test’s Good-Faith Prong, see supra notes 105-106, 112-114 
and accompanying text. 
138. See supra note 125. The numerous factors that have been considered by the various 
bankruptcy courts within the Eighth Circuit demonstrate a need to prevent any factor from being 
considered. See Frattini, supra note 14, at 565 (“[T]he subjectivity inherent with [the Totality of the 
Circumstances Test], combined with numerous and varying factors different courts consider, can lead 
to unpredictable and inconsistent standards of undue hardship.”). 
139. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text. 
140. See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.  
141. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
142. See infra Section IV.B. 











A. Inclusion of a Reinforced Version of the Brunner Test’s Good-Faith 
Prong 
Rather than eliminating the Brunner Test’s Good-Faith Prong, a 
reinforced version is necessary since Congress, when enacting § 523(a)(8), 
was fearful of intentional abusers. 143  If the Good-Faith Prong were 
eliminated, the test would stray from Congress’s original intent. 
Additionally, this reinforced Good-Faith Prong will allow the scope of 
potential debtors seeking discharge to be narrowed to those who are truly 
honest debtors.144 
The Brunner Test’s current Good-Faith Prong presents issues of 
subjectivity because courts do not have proper guidance for applying the 
prong. The guidance that undue hardship “encompasses a notion that the 
debtor may not willfully or negligently cause his own default, but rather his 
condition must result from ‘factors beyond his reasonable control’”145 fails 
to appreciate the foundational principle that bankruptcy courts are courts of 
equity.146 When applying the Brunner Test’s Good-Faith Prong, it is crucial 
that the court be guided with an eye towards equitable relief. To help realign 
this Good-Faith Prong onto the right track, further instructions should be 
given regarding the “principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.”147 For 
example, a proper instruction may mandate that the bankruptcy court apply 
the Good-Faith Prong in a manner consistent with the Fresh Financial Start 
Principle underlying today’s bankruptcy system. 148  Requiring the 
application of the Good-Faith Prong so as to permit the debtor to have a 
“new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by 
the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt” 149  would help 
mitigate the court’s subjectivity. Proper guidance that brings the Bankruptcy 
Code’s equitable nature to the forefront of the analysis would curb the 
subjectivity issues pervading the Brunner Test’s Good-Faith Prong.  
 
143. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
144. One scholar has argued that the Good-Faith Prong be excluded entirely. See G. Michael 
Bedinger VI, Note, Time for a Fresh Look at the “Undue Hardship” Bankruptcy Standard for Student 
Debtors, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1817, 1829 (2014) (noting that the Good-Faith Prong is “detrimental because 
it adds a layer of difficulty for the debtor while lacking a foundation in the statute and legislative 
history”). 
145. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(quoting In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
146. See supra note 38. 
147. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939). 
148. For more on the Fresh Financial Start Principle, see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying 
text. 
149. Layfield v. Dir. of Pub. Safety of Ala. (In re Layfield), 12 B.R. 846, 848 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 












B. The Certainty of Hopelessness Inquiry Has No Place in the 
Dischargeability of Student Loans 
Within the Eighth Circuit’s Totality of the Circumstances Test, the 
Certainty of Hopelessness has been considered as a relevant factor in 
determining whether the debtor has met her burden of satisfying the Undue 
Burden Exception. 150  This harsh and unrealistic factor has no place in 
determining the dischargeability of student loans, which is to be guided by 
equitable considerations, giving particular attention to the Fresh Financial 
Start Principle underlying the Bankruptcy Code. 151  In fact, courts and 
scholars consistently argue that the Certainty of Hopelessness standard is 
unsupported by § 523(a)(8)’s language and the policies underlying the 
Bankruptcy Code.152 To require that the debtor demonstrate a Certainty of 
Hopelessness “would be to sacrifice the notion of [the Fresh Financial Start 
Principle] at the altar of ‘undue hardship.’”153  
C. Courts Should Utilize the Bankruptcy Code’s Equitable Powers and 
Grant Partial Discharge of Student Loans 
As the term’s name implies, a partial discharge is the court’s “flexible” 
approach to discharge a portion of the debtor’s student loans, rather than the 
all-or-nothing treatment that is currently required by § 523(a)(8).154 This 
partial discharge approach has been argued to be permitted under § 105(a) 
of the Bankruptcy Code.155 That is, the bankruptcy court may exercise the 
powers granted to it under §105(a) and discharge only a portion of the 
debtor’s student loans. Section 105(a) has been interpreted as “a ‘catch-all’ 
provision, giving bankruptcy courts a broad delegation of power, rather than 
 
150. See supra note 125. 
151. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
152. See Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 799 (B.A.P. 1st 
Cir. 2010); Speer v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Speer), 272 B.R. 186, 191-92 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2001) (“[Some] courts view ‘undue hardship’ as meaning that a debtor must demonstrate . . . a ‘certainty 
of hopelessness.’ This Court has difficulty with such a strict interpretation for the honest, but financially 
strapped debtor with student loans. This is especially so in light of the fact that the predominant goal of 
the Bankruptcy Code is to provide such honest and financially strapped debtors a fresh start from 
burdensome debt. The difficulty in reconciling the [Undue Burden Exception] with the overriding policy 
goals of bankruptcy has finally compelled this Court to express in writing its continuing frustrations 
with student loan dischargeability issues in general.” (citations omitted)). 
153. Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 744 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000). 
154. See Thad Collins, Note, Forging Middle Ground: Revision of Student Loan Debts in 
Bankruptcy as an Impetus to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), 75 IOWA L. REV. 733, 762 (1990); Bayuk, 
supra note 11, at 1105. For a refresher on the current all-or-nothing discharge approach, see supra note 
11. 
155. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, in relevant part, states, “The court may issue any 
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [Title 11].” 11 
U.S.C. § 105(a). 











specific enumerations, to carry out the mandates and policies of the 
[Bankruptcy Code].”156 The power granted to the bankruptcy court by § 
105(a) is an equitable power.157 The significance of § 105(a) is that student 
loans can be partially discharged even without a finding of undue 
hardship. 158  Nevertheless, even with this equitable power to partially 
discharge student loans, “a great majority of courts do not go so far as to 
dispense with the undue hardship requirement.”159 In fact, to support the 
notion that § 523(a)(8) permits only an all-or-nothing discharge, some 
courts have adopted a “strict” approach reasoning through the statutory 
construction and plain meaning of § 523(a)(8) that a partial discharge is 
impermissible, and thus, either all of the debtor’s student loans are 
discharged or none are.160 
Even if the statutory construction and plain meaning argument against 
partial discharge holds merit, that the bankruptcy courts are ultimately 
courts of equity should dictate that the partial discharge of student loans 
under § 105(a) as applied to § 523(a)(8) should be allowed. Thus, equipped 
with the Modified Test to determine whether the debtor has demonstrated 
the Undue Hardship Exception, and to properly carry out their equitable 
functions, 161  bankruptcy courts must have the power to provide partial 
discharge of student loans even without a showing of undue hardship. 
Applying the principles of equity jurisprudence, including the Fresh 
Financial Start Principle, 162  if a partial discharge of student loans will 
provide the debtor with equitable relief, then the bankruptcy court should 
be able to grant such partial discharge. 
 
156. Bayuk, supra note 11, at 1106. 
157. See id. (noting that § 105(a) power is an “equity power . . . necessary to the proper functioning 
of the bankruptcy courts, as such courts are, after all, courts of equity”). 
158. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 
1998) (“Where a debtor’s circumstances do not constitute undue hardship, some bankruptcy courts have 
thus given a debtor the benefit of a ‘fresh start’ by partially discharging loans . . . .”). Rather than a 
finding of undue hardship, the court stated that partial relief may be provided from “oppressive financial 
circumstances.” Id. While the court fails to define “oppressive financial circumstances,” it may be 
presumed that it is less demanding than a showing of undue hardship. 
159. Bayuk, supra note 11, at 1107. 
160. Amanda M. Foster, Comment, All or Nothing: Partial Discharge of Student Loans is Not the 
Answer to Perceived Unfairness of the Undue Hardship Exception, 16 WIDENER L.J. 1053, 1083-84 
(2007) (noting that “courts adopting the strict approach have found ‘debt,’ as used in the Bankruptcy 
Code, means the entire student loan debt, not individual loans”); see also Bayuk, supra note 11, at 
1101-04. 
161. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 













The student loan crisis affecting millions of Americans spanning 
multiple generations is unquestionably a significant barrier to personal 
advancement. Congress’s failure to provide a definition for “undue hardship” 
coupled with the federal judiciary’s inadequate development of acceptable 
tests to define the Undue Hardship Exception has left honest American 
debtors to suffer financially and socially with no end in sight.  
In confronting the student loan crisis, our bankruptcy courts have lost 
sight of their equitable foundation. Since the first Undue Hardship 
Exception test, the Johnson Test, the courts have failed to provide the help 
that debtors drowning in thousands of dollars desperately need. The 
Brunner Test, adopted by an overwhelming majority of our federal circuits, 
has failed to not only remove the subjectivity afforded to judges, but has 
moreover required the Certainty of Hopelessness, which, by its nature, is in 
stark contrast to the principles of equity. While the Modified Test is by no 
means ideal, it will serve as a starting point that is aligned with the equitable 
principles underlying bankruptcy. The Modified Test’s departure from the 
Brunner Test’s rigid three-part analysis will permit the bankruptcy courts to 
properly utilize their equitable powers afforded under the Bankruptcy Code, 
such as the ability to partially discharge a student debt. Additionally, the 
reinforced Good-Faith Prong and the elimination of the Certainty of 
Hopelessness will reduce the court’s subjective inquiry and prevent the 
intrusive probing of a debtor’s personal life. 
Not every American student aspiring to pursue a respectable profession 
is blessed with parents or family members who can fund their college 
education. Within a society that makes a college education mandatory for 
success, there must be an available outlet that provides relief if one’s 
mandatory education—that required tens or hundreds of thousands of 
dollars—has failed to provide the means to be a healthy contributing 
member of society. 
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